Volume 57

Issue 1

Article 21

March 1955

Taxation--Gift Tax--Partial Restoration to Donor as Ground for
Claiming
B. E. B.
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons

Recommended Citation
B. E. B., Taxation--Gift Tax--Partial Restoration to Donor as Ground for Claiming, 57 W. Va. L. Rev. (1955).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol57/iss1/21

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

B.: Taxation--Gift Tax--Partial Restoration to Donor as Ground for Cl
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TAXATION - GIFT

TAx -

PARTIAL RESTORATION TO DONOR AS

intending to make
a gift of stock to Ps, had the stock transferred into Ps' names, and
delivered the stock certificates to an attorney, under an agreement
that G was to receive all dividends during her life, and upon her
death the attorney was to deliver the stock to Ps; but if ever Ps
failed to pay the dividends to G, the stock was to be returned to
her. Treating the gift as complete, Ps paid the gift tax thereon.
Later, G and Ps had a disagreement, and G sued to recover the
stock, alleging undue influence, which Ps denied. By compromise
before trial, G recovered part of the stock, and Ps kept the rest free
from any and all claims of G. Ps sought a refund of the gift tax
paid on account of the stock returned to G, alleging the gift was
incomplete as to them. Held, the transfers were completed gifts
at the time made; Ps are not entitled to a refund. Short v. United
States, 120 F. Supp. 755 (S.D. W. Va. 1954).
This seems to be a case of first impression, so much so that the
court did not find a single authority which it regarded as relevant
enough to cite. However, on principle and in relation to the
law of gifts generally, there seems no doubt that the decision is
correct. The central issue, whether the gifts were complete before
the compromise settlement, depends on the effect of (1) the
reservation of dividends by the donor during life, (2) the provisio n for re-transfer to the donor if the donees should fail to pay
over such dividends, and (3) the compromise settlement of the
alleged undue-influence dispute.
It is settled law that a gift is not complete and final so long
as the donor reserves the power to revoke, disaffirm, or modify the
gift, and does not become so until that power is either terminated
or surrendered, Burnett v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1932), as
well where such power is raised by implication of law, as where
it is expressly reserved. CIR v. Allen, 108 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1939),
cert. denied, 309 U.S. 680 (1940). To make a gift inter vivos complete and final, the donor must deliver the property with the intent
to make a gift, must part with all right, dominion, and control
over the property, Copeland v. CIR, 41 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1930);
Provident Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 58 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Iowa
1944); and the gift must be absolute and irrevocable and go into
effect immediately, not in the future. Steber v. Combs, 121 W. Va.
509, 5 S.E.2d 420 (1939). Aside from the reservation of dividends,
there was clearly a complete gift at the time of the transfer. The
donor, with a donative intention, having delivered the certificates to
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an attorney to hold for donees and parted with control, right,
title, and dominion over the stock by having it transferred to the
donees' names on the books of the corporations, the gift took effect
upon the transfer of the certificates, for where the owner of stock
has the certificates therefor issued in the name of another and so
registered on the corporate books, that is a sufficiently complete
gift of the stock, although the donee does not receive actual possession if the donor has otherwise parted with control and dominion
over it. Hardymon v. Glenn, 56 F. Supp. 269 (W.D. Ky. 1944);
Buffalo v. Barnes, 226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946). That
receipt of the dividends was postponed until the donor's death
merely affected the enjoyment, not the completeness, of the gift or
the transfer of title. "Where a gift is absolute, postponement of
delivery and enjoyment does not necessarily prevent the passing of
a present interest, even though the donee does not obtain possession
until after the donor's death." Chestnutt v. Durham, 224 N.C.
149, 151, 29 S.E.2d 339, 840 (1944). Where there is an absolute
gift of personal property to a third person to deliver to the donee
after the donor's death, the donor's reservation during his lifetime of the earnings of the property, such as the dividends on stock,
is not such a failure to relinquish dominion and control over the
property as will defeat a gift inter vivos otherwise valid, Beaumont
v. Beaumont, 152 Fed. 55 (3d Cir. 1907). Reservation by the donor
of the right to the dividends during life is merely a limitation of
the quantity of the gift, not affecting its validity, Smith v. CIR, 59
F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1982), and not inconsistent with a perfected gift
of the stock. Payne v. Tobacco Trading Corp., 179 Va. 156, 18
S.E.2d 281 (1942). Hence reservation of the dividends during the
donor's life did not affect the completeness of that gift.
The donor, by the provision for return of the stock if the
donees should fail to turn over the dividends, did not reserve a
power to revoke the gift. The donor renounced any power to
recall the stock so long as the donees complied with the condition.
If any power to revoke existed, it was in the donees rather than in
the donor. A true condition subsequent does not, though it render
the property subject to be divested by the happening of the condition subsequent, affect the completeness of the original gift. It
cannot be seen ". . . upon principle, how a gift, if absolute, and
delivered to a third person for the donee ... if liable to be wholly
defeated if a certain event occurs, is any the less a valid gift."
Blanchard v. Sheldon, 43Vt. 512, 513 (1871). A fortiori, this would
seem true where, as in the principal case, the condition is entirely
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beyond the donor's control and within the exclusive control of
the donees. Whether the gift would endure was entirely up to the
donees. Without the donees' default, the donor could do nothing,
and there had been no such default through the time of the compromise settlement.
CIR v. Allen, supra, declared that a gift would be incomplete
if subject to recall either by express reservation or by implication
of law. Did the alleged undue influence render this gift subject
to recall by implication of law? The court thought not. The
Allen case is clearly distinguishable. There the donor was an
infant, and consequently the gift was incomplete. But infancy is
certain, and the implication of law is only the application of determinate consequences to a determined fact. While the undue influence
here alleged by the donor was steadily denied by plaintiffs,
its existence as a fact could not properly be assumed nor established
independently of a determination by a court of competent jurisdiction. Though a suit was instituted, it never came to trial and
so it was never determined whether undue influence existed. Had
it been so determined, the gift would have been incomplete,
through the implication of law subjecting it to recall because of the
undue influence, but the mere contested allegation could not
support that implication of law.
The compromise settlement whereby the donor recovered a
portion of the stock, and plaintiffs retained the rest free from all
claims of the donor, did not undo the completed gift. Return of
a part of the stock to the donor, if it tended to show such were
subject to recall, was, the court remarked, countered by retention
of a part by donees which was just as logically indicative that the
gift was final. The subsequent agreement of the parties was a new
and separate transaction amounting in legal effect to another
separate and distinct gift from the original donees to the original
donor, or perhaps to a conveyance if consideration be given therefor,
but in neither event qualifying the rights established by the original
transfer.
B. E. B.

UNEMPLOYMENT
TARY

COMPENSATION -

DISQUALIFICATION -

VOLUN-

IDLENESS.-Certain employees of three companies, as a result

of plant shutdowns for the purpose of giving two-weeks vacation,
filed claims for unemployment compensation benefits under W. VA.
CoDE c. 21A (Michie, 1949). The employees of all three companies
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